Institutional investors and securities markets : which comes first? by Vittas, Dimitri
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2032
Institutional Investors  The answer  varies by type of
investor. Pension  funds and
and Securities Markets  insurance  companies should
be promoted for their own
W  hich Comes First?  sake,  but mutual funds are
unlikely  to thrive  without well-
regulated securities  markets.
Dimitri  Vittas  Anglo-American experience
suggests  that institutional
investors  can provide a strong
stimulus to market
development. This takes  time
and requires both critical
mass  and conducive
regulations.
The World Bank


















































































































dX POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2032
Summary findings
Institutional investors comprise pension funds, insurance  reforming governments ample time to develop securities
companies, and mutual funds. Should a country promote  markets.
their creation if it lacks well-developed securities  More important than the prior  development of
markets? The answer to this question, says Vittas, varies  securities markets is a strong and lasting political
by type of investor.  commitment to holistic reform: macroeconomic, fiscal,
He argues that private pension funds and insurance  banking, and capital market reform, as well as pension
companies are promoted  for their own sake and for their  and insurance reform.
potential economic, fiscal, and financial benefits,  Institutional investors need to attain critical mass and
whether or not a country already has well-developed  to be supported  by conducive regulations. Vittas reviews
securities markets. Mutual funds, by contrast, are  Anglo-American experience since the 1940s. This shows
unlikely to thrive without strong and well-regulated  that institutional investors can serve as a countervailing
securities markets.  force to commercial and investment banks, helping to
A limited supply of financial instruments should not be  stimulate financial innovation, modernize capital
a major obstacle to the creation of pension funds and  markets, enhance transparency and disclosure, strengthen
insurance companies. Such institutions build up their  corporate governance, and improve financial regulation.
financial resources gradually but steadily, giving
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San Salvador,  El SalvadorIntroduction'
Institutional investors comprise pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds. Of
the three, pension funds have traditionally  been the most important component with resources
exceeding 50 percent of GDP in a score of countries around the world. Insurance company assets,
especially life insurance assets but excluding any pension fund assets managed by insurance
companies, rarely exceed 30 percent of GDP, while mutual fund assets have until recently been
well below 20 percent of GDP in most countries.
Recently mutual fund assets have grown at a very fast rate in the United States and many
other countries. In fact, assets of US mutual funds now exceed 50 percent of GDP, although
some of these represent investments by company pension funds. Moreover, with the recent
growth of personal pension plans, the traditional distinction between pension and mutual funds
has been blurred considerably. In 1996, retirement plans of all kinds accounted for 35 percent of
total mutual fund assets in the United States, while retirement plans invested in mutual funds
accounted for 19 percent of all retirement assets (Investment Company Institute 1998).
Although retirement-linked mutual funds have a longer horizon than ordinary mutual
funds, the ability of savers to switch across funds and the increasing use of commingled funds for
both retirement and other purposes suggests that pension funds and mutual funds increasingly
have the same policy implications for securities markets irrespective of the purpose for which they
are held. Historically, however, (company) pension funds had different structures and objectives
and their policy implications may have differed from those of mutual funds.
The Sequencing  Issue
Implicit in the title of this paper lies an important policy question. Should a country
promote the creation of private pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds in the
I am grateful to Tom Glaessner,  Fernando  Solis-Soberon,  Alfred  Steinherr,  and Salvador  Valdes-Prieto,
discussants  of the paper, for their comments  and insights.
Iabsence  of well developed  securities  markets? 2 The answer  to this question  varies  for each type of
institutional  investor.
With regard  to pension  funds,  the policy  question  can take two forms.  The first and
stronger  form asks  whether  a country  should  undertake  systemic  pension  reform  with a
compulsory  fully  funded  pillar  in the absence  of well  developed  securities  markets. 3 The weaker
version  asks whether  a country  should  offer tax incentives  for the voluntary  creation  of funded
pension  schemes.
To address  the stronger  form first consider  an imaginary  country  that lacks all the
fundamental  elements  of a well  functioning  financial  system:  no solvent  banks  and insurance
companies;  no mutual  funds and securities  markets  for bonds and equities;  no long-term  financial
instruments  and annuity  products;  no experienced  regulators  and supervisors;  no bankers  and
actuaries;  no accountants  and lawyers;  and no rating agencies.  Should  such a country  reform  its
pension  system  and introduce  a mandatory  retirement  savings  scheme?  Normally,  my answer
would  be a firm  no. Such a country  should  not even  have a traditional  unfunded  social  security
system  and if it happens  to have  one, it is virtually  certain  that it would  be malfunctioning,
suffering  from evasion,  incomplete  records,  administrative  inefficiencies,  and strategic
manipulation.
There are, however,  three preconditions  whose  fulfillment  would  allow  even  a country
lackirng  all the essential  elements  of a well  developed  financial  system  to consider  undertaking
systemic  pension  reform.  These include:  a strong,  long-term  and persistent  government
commitment  to implement  a successful  pension  reform;  introduction  of effective  arrangements  for
the safe custody  of pension  fund assets (to prevent  theft and misuse  of assets);  and free access  to
foreign  expertise.  These preconditions  are not easy  to fulfill.  The first implies  a holistic  approach
to economic  reforms  and a willingness  to proceed with banking,  insurance  and capital  market as
well  as macroeconomic  and fiscal  reforms.  It also implies  that successive  governments  even  if they
come  from different  political  parties  would  be committed  to the success  of pension  reform.
2  The  term  securities  markets  is used  here  to refer  to both  equity  and debt  instruments,  although  traditional
concern  was often  focused  on the underdevelopment  of equity  markets.
3  The merits  and demerits  of systemic  pension  reform,  which  involves  a move  away  from complete  reliance  on
an unfunded  public  pillar, are not discussed  in this paper. For a comprehensive  review  of the arguments  for
systemic  pension  refonn, see World  Bank (1994). A more succinct  overview  is provided  in Vittas (1996).
2Openness to foreign expertise implies a willingness to see large foreign financial  institutions play a
leading part in the funded pillar, ideally in joint ventures with large local groups, and by extension
in the domestic financial system. Ensuring safe custody of pension assets also implies reliance on
institutions with the large financial resources and advanced technical capabilities that are required
for providing an effective custodial service.
Very few, if any, countries satisfy these unlikely sets of conditions. Countries that lack all
the essential elements of well functioning financial systems would also be unlikely to show the
strong commitment to holistic reform, effective safe custody, and free access to foreign expertise.
For the majority of countries that are characterized by somewhat weaker commitments and
somewhat better developed financial systems, the important financial preconditions for systemic
pension reform would include commitment to macroeconomic stability and presence of at least a
small number of sound and well functioning banks and insurance companies. Prior development of
securities markets would not be necessary, although willingness  to implement capital market
reforms and openness to foreign expertise would be essential for the long-term success of pension
reform.
Thus, to determine a country's readiness to implement systemic pension reform, it is more
important to assess the commitment of the authorities to a holistic reform program than to
evaluate the state of development of its securities markets. A basic reason for this is that the
creation of private pension funds involves a gradual accumulation of long-term financial
resources. This provides sufficient time to a reforming government to take all necessary steps for
establishing robust and well-regulated securities markets.
In fact, in cases of systemic pension reform involving  a gradual accumulation of assets, the
most pressing issue in implementing  the reform program may well be ensuring a sufficient
technical capability for collecting contributions and keeping records rather than an adequate
supply of long-term financial instruments. Initially, at least, the relatively small resources of
pension funds can be invested in treasury bills and bank deposits. As pension fund assets increase,
a growing proportion can be allocated to longer-term government bonds and corporate securities.
Technical constraints as well as political opposition and the burden of the transition cost are
usually greater obstacles to systemic pension reformn  than the state of development of securities
3markets. This is in some sense ironic because among the main benefits of systemic pension reform
are the positive externalities associated with the development of securities markets.
If the answer is affirmative to the stronger form of the question, it will also be affirmative
to its weaker version. In the absence of well-developed securities markets, voluntary employer-
sponsored pension funds will invest in book reserves, effectively nonmarketable equity of the
sponsoring employers. This was widespread practice in all countries, including Anglo-American
ones, prior to the 1950s, but has persisted into the present in Germany and some other European
countries. Book reserves can be combined with holdings of government bonds and bank deposits.
Over time book reserves have been replaced, especially in Anglo-American countries, with
marketable government and corporate securities.
The argument in favor of private pension funds counters a long-standing criticism of
traditional social security experts against funded pension schemes. The criticism was that in the
absence of well-developed capital markets, funded pension schemes would fail because they
would be used as captive sources for financing large budget deficits at negative real rates of
interest. The traditional criticism of funded pension schemes was probably valid before the 1970s
when government policies in most developing countries were inflationary and financial market
development was not an important objective of government policy. But it overlooked the dynamic
interaction that could develop between pension funds and capital markets once government
policies focused on maintaining financial stability and on removing obstacles that inhibited the
development of markets. The experience of several OECD and, more recently, Latin American
countries shows that both private pension funds and capital markets can thrive under the right
macroeconomic policies, meaning low inflation  (or moderate inflation with indexed instruments),
small budget deficits and positive long-term real rates of interest. 4
Insurance reform is also primarily sought for its own sake, as insurance business is
underdeveloped in most low and middle income countries. In addition to achieving
macroeconomic stability, reforming the insurance sector implies the removal of repressive
4  The interaction  between  securities  markets  and pension  funds may  materialize  even if private  pension  funds
represent  a small,  but significant,  part of the pension  system.  It is not necessary  to implement  a complete
privatization  of social security  to obtain  the capital market  benefits  of private  pension  funds. In fact, a mixed
private/public  pension  system  may be preferable  as it allows  a diversification  across  providers  and may offer
better  protection  against the long-term  volatility  of capital markets  (Vittas 1996).
4regulations  that impede  competition,  innovation  and efficiency.  Insurance  sectors  in developing
countries  are often dominated  by state-owned  entities  with limited  participation  by private  or
foreign  companies  and are characterized  by inadequate  capital,  high  operating  costs, limited
product innovation,  low  investment  returns,  lax control  over brokers, high  levels  of receivables,
extensive  fraud,  unduly  large  claims  by some  insured  but otherwise  low claims  and settlements  for
the majority  of customers,  protracted  disputes  and long delays  in settlement,  and generally
widespread  mutual  mistrust  between  insurance  companies  and the insured.
Improving  financial  returns is only  one of many  actions  that can be taken to enhance  the
performance  of the insurance  sector. Because  of a smaller  accumulation  of financial  assets  by
insurance  companies  in comparison  to pension  funds,  the impact  of insurance  reform  on capital
market development  is also less  extensive.  In contrast,  improving  financial  returns is more central
for pension  funds,  which  specialize  in offering  long-term  capital  accumulation  accounts.
Nevertheless,  insurance  reform  may  be an essential  element  of systemic  pension  reform  because  of
the derived  demand  for term life  and disability  insurance  by active  workers and of annuity
products  by retiring  workers.
The situation  of mutual  funds is different.  Passing  mutual  fund legislation  and creating  an
enabling  environment  for their establishment  is usually  an integral  part of measures  to promote
capital  market development.  But mutual  funds  specializing  in particular  instruments  are unlikely  to
thrive  unless  the markets  for those  instruments  are also well  developed.  In many  developing
countries,  the mutual  fund  industry  is dominated  by funds  investing  in government  bonds or bank
deposits,  with only  a small  part accounted  for by equity  funds.  In most cases,  this is probably
explained  by the usually  high level  of real interest  rates on debt instruments  and the continuing
lack of confidence  in equity  markets.  Whatever  the reasons,  this experience  suggests  that mutual
funds  follow  the development  of securities  markets,  unlike  pension  funds,  which  often predate
them, and insurance  companies,  whose development  is often  unrelated  to the development  of
securities  markets.
Dynamic Interaction
The sequencing  issue, whether  different  types  of institutional  investors  lead  or follow  the
development  of securities  markets,  is an interesting  question  but it is less important  than the
5interactive issue. Experience from Anglo-American countries suggests large potential benefits
from the interactive process between institutional investors and securities markets. Institutional
investors can act as a countervailing force to the dominant position of commercial banks and thus
promote competition and efficiency in the financial system. They can also stimulate financial
innovation, modernize capital markets, enhance transparency and information disclosure, and
strengthen corporate govemance. The efficiency gains from these qualitative changes in the
functioning of financial systems may far exceed the growth effects from the quantitative
development of banks and securities markets that have been documented in recent years (Levine
and Zervos 1996). Although empirical quantification of these efficiency  gains remains to be done,
there is considerable evidence attesting to the enhanced efficiency of the financial system.
The efficiency  gains from the development of institutional investors are not automatic.
They are less likely to materialize if institutional investors are required to invest only in
nonmarketable government securities as has long been the case with the national provident funds
of Singapore and Malaysia. Although these funds have avoided the fate of provident funds in
African countries, where high negative real rates of return have eroded the real value of fund
balances, they have failed to provide a direct stimulus to the development of domestic securities
markets. In similar vein, although to a much lesser extent, institutional investors in continental
European countries have been constrained by quantitative investment limits and by conservative
investment policies from exerting a beneficial effect on capital market development. In contrast, in
Anglo-American countries, institutional investors have made a stronger contribution to capital
market development. Operating under the "prudent person" rule, they have also been able to earn
higher rates of return than in countries with quantitative investment limits (Davis 1997).
The emergence of institutional investors as large financial institutions is quite recent in
developing countries. The remainder of this paper examines the impact of institutional investors
on the US financial system, with occasional references to the experience of other Anglo-American
countries as well as Chile and Argentina, two reforming countries where institutional investors
have started to have an impact on financial market structures and practices. It is, however,
important to remember that the interactive process between markets and institutions that is
emphasized in this paper takes considerable time to come to fruition. Patience and persistence are
strongly recommended.
6Countervailing Force
One of the main benefits of the growth of institutional investors is the intensification of
competition in the financial system. The development of new sources of finance, whether from
new entry of foreign banks, access to foreign markets, or the growth of institutional and other
nonbank financial intermediaries (such as leasing and factoring companies) forces dominant
commercial banks to become more competitive and to start seeking out their customers rather
than waiting for prospective borrowers to visit them. In the United States, this change in bank
behavior seems to have taken place in the 1940s and 1950s, followed within a decade or so by
other Anglo-American countries, and in subsequent years by most developed and developing
countries.
In the United States, the process was stimulated not only by the growth of institutional
investors but also by a notable change in the investment policies of life insurance companies, a
group of institutions that commanded a significant  share of US financial assets since the beginning
of the century. Life insurance companies controlled 11 percent of the total assets of US financial
institutions in 1900 against 66 percent for commercial  banks. This rose to  17 percent by 1929 and
to 25 percent by 1940, when commercial bank assets had declined to 55 percent (Krooss and Blyn
1971). In the 1940s and 1950s insurance companies lowered substantially their holdings of
government bonds and agricultural mortgages and increased their holdings of nonfarm mortgages
and especially of privately placed corporate debt (Calomiris and Raff 1995). Private placements
were favored by borrowers who had limited access to the public bond market and for whom the
total issue costs of private placements were lower than those of public placements (Calomiris and
Raff 1995 and Carey and others 1993). The growth of insurance company lending to industrial
and commercial companies increased competition to bank loans.
The development of institutional investors also contributed to the advent of competitive
bidding for corporate issues of securities. Historically, new issue business was highly rigid and
hierarchical. Investment banks were jealous of their syndicate positions and their ranking in
particular issues. The large investment banks cultivated close relations with large corporate
issuers, acted as sole managers for new issues, and organized large syndicates for underwriting
and distributing them. Relative positions in these syndicated issues were rigidly respected
7(Chemow 1990). Although the SEC promoted the use of competitive bidding through regulatory
means in the 1930s and 1940s, the market impact was limited. The SEC first required sealed bids
for new issues of corporate securities in the 1930s and then implemented rule 50 on competitive
bidding in 1940. But because of strong opposition from investment banks, this was only applied
on bond issues by large utility companies and railroads. Issues by industrial and commercial
corporations as well as private placements, which had the largest issue spreads, were exempted
(Carosso 1970).
But what was not achieved by regulatory fiat was brought about by the growth of
institutional investors, the resources of which reached critically large levels in the 1970s. While
traditional investment banks maintained unrivaled close relations with large corporations, new
investment banks that specialized on trading rather than issuing and underwriting securities
developed close relations with institutional investors. The greater availability of financial
resources encouraged corporations to place new issues directly with institutional investors, to
replace sole management of their public issues by several  joint lead managers, and to set up
"Dutch auctions" for their new issues and invite competing syndicates of underwriters.
In the 1980s and 1990s, institutional money fueled the operations of corporate raiders, the
use of leveraged buyouts, and the growth of high-yield securities, all of which contributed to
greater competition in financial markets and facilitated the corporate restructuring that took place
in the 1980s and 1990s. Institutional investors have also supported the growth of venture capital
funds and the provision of private equity, both of which help finance new and expanding smaller
firms.
Another benefit of the growth of institutional investors was the decline in both new issue
and trading costs. The first was not just a result of the countervailing force of institutional
investors, but it also reflected lower marketing and monitoring costs of issues targeted at
institutional investors. Studies report narrower spreads for new issues by companies in which
institutional investors are large shareholders (Hansen and Torregrosa 1992, Hansen and Pinkerton
1982). The fall in trading commissions was associated with the rise of bloc trading that was
prompted by the growing importance of institutional investors. Trading commissions for large
trades fell by 40 percent after the abolition of minimum  commissions in New York in 1975
8(Chernow 1990). Large trade commissions also fell in London after the stock exchange reform in
1986 and in all the stock markets that have followed in the steps of New York and London.
Financial Innovation
The past three decades witnessed major new financial innovations as well as a large
expansion of the financial services industry. Most of the innovations in the 1970s were prompted
by the increase in the level and volatility of interest rates, but institutional investors, and especially
pension funds, were major forces stimulating this innovative process (Bodie 1990). Financial
innovation was also influenced by regulatory changes.
The response of most lenders and borrowers to the high and unpredictable interest rates of
the early 1970s was a move to the use of floating rate debt, including adjustable rate mortgages, a
process that had already taken place in Britain during the 1960s. However, pension legislation
enacted in 1974 codified the liabilities  of US private pension funds and imposed minimum  funding
requirements. This created a strong demand for long-duration fixed-income securities by pension
funds and contributed to the emergence and growth of both zero-coupon bonds and mortgage-
backed securities.
It is interesting to note that mortgage securitization did not take off until another unrelated
and ill-advised regulatory change provided a strong incentive for the supply of securitized
mortgages. This regulation allowed thrift institutions to sell their low fixed-rate mortgage loans in
the early 1980s, when market interest rates were very high, and to amortize the losses over a
longer period (Barth 1991). Mortgage securitization also facilitated the regional diversification of
mortgage portfolios of US commercial banks and thrift deposit institutions. Securitized
mortgages, and especially collateralized mortgage obligations with their successive maturity
tranches, provided an attractive outlet for the long-term resources of institutional investors, who
now hold about one third of all outstanding agency securities in the US financial system.
The immunization strategies of pension funds also promoted the use of derivative
products, such as index options and futures contracts, while pension funds also spurred
innovations in the equity markets. The first indexed (or index-tracking) mutual fund was created
for pension funds in 1971, in response to the growing realization that active investment
management failed on average to achieve higher net returns than a fund that was passively
9invested  in a market index.  The first index-tracking  fund  for retail investors  was established  in
1976  (Bogle 1994).  Since  then there have  been several  additional  innovations  with index-tracking
funds  for bonds, rnidcap  and small  cap equities,  value and growth  equities,  and international
equities.
More recently,  in response  to the growing  popularity  of defined  contribution  retirement
plans  and the demand  for a more effective  management  of investment  risk, new synthetic
investment  products  have  been developed.  These  minimize  the downside  risk of equity
investments  (by providing  a floor on the value of investments  over some  period of time),  while
allowing  some  participation  in the upside  potential  of the equity  market  (Bodie  and Crane 1998).
Financial  innovation  in developing  countries  that have  implemented  systemic  pension
reform  has been faster and more directly  linked  to the creation  of private pension  funds. In Chile,
which  reformed  its pension  system  in 1981,  pension  funds  supported  the development  of both
mortgage  and corporate  bond markets  (Diamond  and Valdes-Prieto  1994).  The outstanding
volumes  of mortgage  and corporate  bonds  grew from negligible  levels  in 1981  to respectively  9
percent and 4 percent of GDP by 1993,  while  government  bonds and central  bank securities
amounted  to 28 percent  of GDP in 1993.  Pension  funds  and insurance  companies  (which
benefited  directly  from  the pension  reform  program)  held  over 95 percent of each category  of
these  bonds.
In Argentina,  which  reformed  its pension  system  in 1994,  financial  innovation  has allowed
pension  funds to invest  in synthetic  products  with a more attractive  risk/return  tradeoff  than either
bank deposits  or marketable  securities.  For example,  the vast majority  of bank deposits  (covering
23 percent of total assets)  were placed  in December  1997  in certificates  of deposit  with a variable
return linked  to an underlying  bond or stockmarket  index.  Although  these innovations  involve
products  with embedded  options  that are difficult  to price, they  benefit  pension  funds  by limiting
their downside  risk,  while  allowing  them  to share  in the upside  potential  of the underlying  index.
Nevertheless,  they expose  them to counterparty  risks,  which  can be very large if the financial
institutions  offering  such  instruments  are not consistently  and at all times properly  hedged.
However,  the banks offering  such synthetic  products  to the Argentine  pension  funds are large
international  banks that have  the expertise  and internal  control  systems  to ensure  their ability  to
honor these contracts.  Argentine  pension  funds  also invested  in securitized  instruments  based  on
10credit  card and other receivables.  In both Chile  and Argentina,  the private  pension  funds have  also
been  able to invest  in the securities  of privatized  enterprises.
Market Integrity
Most investors  are concerned  about market  integrity  and fair prices,  which  depend  on the
timely  disclosure  of meaningful  information  and the protection  of minority  shareholders  from
market  manipulation  and other exploitation  by controlling  groups  of shareholders.  Institutional
investors,  which  are managed  by trained  professionals,  are usually  more  aware than ordinary
investors  of the potential  conflicts  of interest  and agency  problems  facing  corporate management
and are better able  to insist  on investor  protection  legislation  that will  ensure market  integrity.
Investor  protection  rules cover  prohibition  and penalties  on insider  trading  and reporting
of insider  positions  as well  as rules on self-dealing,  takeovers  and changes  in corporate  controls,
asset valuation,  prospectuses  for new issues,  and disclosure  of audited  consolidated  statements  on
public  companies.  Investor  protection  rules are better developed  in countries  where large
institutional  investors  hold diversified  minority  positions  in a large  number  of companies  than in
countries  where institutional  investors  are either  underdeveloped  (e.g. Germany)  or tend to hold
large controlling  positions  in a small  number  of companies  (e.g. South Afiica).  At the same  time,
a stronger  legal protection  of minority  shareholder  rights  may  have contributed  to the earlier  and
on a larger scale diversification  into equities  of institutional  investors  in Anglo-American  countries
compared  to continental  European  countries.
Mindful  of the need  to protect the long-term  interests  of workers  affiliated  to the new
private pension  funds,  the authorities  in Chile,  Argentina  and other reforming  countries  have  taken
measures  to strengthen  investor  protection,  especially  in the areas of insider  trading, self-dealing,
and  takeover rules.  The publication  of consolidated  statements  following  internationally  accepted
accounting  and auditing  standards  is not yet fully  implemented,  although  pressures  for the
disclosure  of timely  and meaningful  information  on corporate  performance  are mounting.
Pension reform  led to the development  of an effective  risk classification  system  in Chile
under a committee  comprising  public  officials  and representatives  of the private  pension  funds.
This committee  rates various  instruments  for their suitability  as pension  fund investments.  They
screen  ratings  prepared  by private  rating agencies  and thus avoid  to some  extent  the problems
11caused by an alleged low quality of private ratings. The quality of private ratings is also raising
concerns in Argentina. In both countries competition among a large number of rating agencies
seems to have resulted in a lowering of standards. This may, however, be a temporary setback.
The quality of ratings is likely to improve once a consolidation of rating agencies takes place and
higher quality standards are adopted.
Modernization  of Market  Trading
Institutional investors also exert pressures for modem and efficient trading facilities. This
covers not only the trading activity per se but also clearing and settlement facilities as well as the
creation of central depository agencies. Efficient trading systems are characterized by low
transaction costs, high transparency, high liquidity, and low volatility. There is often a tradeoff
between these characteristics and especially between high liquidity and low volatility on the one
hand and low transaction costs and high transparency on the other.
Although there are several different ways in which trading systems can be organized,
institutional investors have contributed to the development of more efficient trading systems. As
already noted, the use of bloc trading led to the abolition of minimum  commissions and the
restructuring of stock markets in many countries around the world. Institutional investors have
also played an important part in promoting more efficient clearing facilities and establishing
central depository agencies that facilitate the move to book-entry systems and provide
safekeeping services. And they have exerted pressure for modem efficient and reliable back-office
operations that have suffered in all countries with emerging securities markets as existing facilities
could not cope with fast growing trading volumes.
The impact of institutional investors on trading and market liquidity depends on their
investment policies and the extent to which they trade actively their portfolios. Newly established
private pension funds tend to adopt a policy of "buy and hold." This is often explained by the
gradual but steady increase in their financial resources at the start of their operations. Any
rebalancing of their investment portfolios can be easily effected by redirecting new inflows of
funds, without requiring large sales of existing holdings. The limited supply of suitable securities is
also another reason behind such "buy and hold" strategies.
12In this respect, it is instructive to note that a similar pattern was followed in the United
States and the United Kingdom when corporate pension funds started to place their reserves in
corporate equities. For instance, a "buy and hold" strategy was advocated by the trust department
of Morgan Guaranty in the early 1960s (Chernow 1990). Morgan Guaranty had the largest trust
department among commercial banks and was one of the designated managers of the pension fund
of General Motors that had decided in the early 1950s to allocate up to 50 percent of its pension
reserves into equities. Similarly  the Imperial Tobacco Pension Fund diversified into equities in the
late 1940s and followed a "buy and hold" strategy while it was building its equity portfolio.
The initial and amply  justified "buy and hold" strategies delay the beneficial impact of
institutional investors on market liquidity. However, they do not justify the conclusion that the
development of a fully-funded pension system is unlikely to develop local stock markets per se
(Reisen 1997). Over time, pension funds and their asset managers are likely to adopt more active
trading policies, enhancing the liquidity of markets and leading to higher efficiency  and lower
transaction costs.
Corporate  Governance
The role of institutional investors in corporate governance has evolved in line with their
growing importance as corporate owners. As long as their equity holdings were small and
diversified in a large number of companies and as long as they represented a small fraction of
market capitalization, institutional investors adopted a passive approach to corporate governance.
They tended to vote with management and if they were unhappy with corporate performance,
they could sell without suffering a big fall in market price.
But with continuing growth in their accumulated assets, institutional investors became
collectively dominant shareholders of many nonfinancial corporations. Among large US
corporations, institutional investors owned in 1988 86 percent of the equity of Amoco, 82 percent
of General Motors, 74 percent of Mobil and 70 percent of Citicorp (Coffee 1991). With such
dominant positions, they could no longer exercise the "exit" option without disrupting the market
and suffering big falls in market prices.
Recent attempts to develop effective means for exercising "voice" in corporate affairs are
a response to the decline of the "exit" option. In addition, institutional investors have been
13adopting  investment  policies  based  on passive  indexation  as an effective  strategy  for achieving
diversification  with market returns and low  transaction  costs. Passive  indexation  policies  have
limited  their ability  to divest  from poorly  performing  companies  and have  increased  pressures  for
more effective  monitoring  of corporate performance  and for increasing  the accountability  of
corporate managers.
Faced with persistently  poorly  performing  corporations,  some  institutional  investors
increased  their public  criticism  of overambitious  expansion  plans,  excessive  managerial
compensation,  and anti-takeover  defenses  that entrenched  the position  of incumbent  managers  at
the expense  of shareholders.  Open public  criticism  has been instrumental  in mobilizing  collective
action  by disgruntled  shareholders  and in raising  the threat of regulation  and legislation  to prohibit
the alleged  abuse  and misbehavior.
In the United  States,  public  criticism  of poor corporate  performance  has been led by public
pension  funds, such as the California  Public  Employees  Retirement  System  (CALPERS)  and the
New York State Common  Retirement  Fund, which  were independent  of corporate  management.
But another  effective  way of voicing  public  criticism  has been  the use of formal  associations  of
institutional  investors  (such as the Association  of British  Insurers  and the National  Association  of
Pension  Funds in the United  Kingdom)  or ad hoc groupings  of interested  institutional  investors
(such as the Institutional  Shareholders  Committee  in the United  Kingdom  or the Council  of
Institutional  Investors  in the United  States).  The last-named  group was created 14 years ago and
is a forum  for big institutional  shareholders  to discuss  corporate problems.  It regularly  publishes  a
list of the 50 least performing  companies  and  thus exerts  pressure on the offending  corporate
managers  without  exposing  any individual  shareholder  or pension  fund  manager  to the threat of
corporate retaliation.
Institutional  investors  have  also emphasized  the importance  of strengthening  corporate
governance  structures  and especially  of increasing  the accountability  of managers,  a process  that
is ongoing.  In the United  Kingdom,  three high level  committees  have published  reports
recommending  various  measures  to strengthen  corporate  governance,  while  in the United States,
two codes  of corporate governance  were issued  recently,  one by CALPERS  and the other by the
Council  of Institutional  Investors.
14The measures  that are contemplated  to strengthen  corporate  governance  structures  and
improve  the effiectiveness  of corporate  boards  include  the following:  separating  the functions  of
chairman  and chief  executive  officer  and appointing  nonexecutive  chairmen  in all companies
above a certain  size;  electing  independent  extemal  directors;  using cumulative  voting  for board
elections;  opening  the proxy process  to allow  greater communication  among  shareholders;  using
confidential  voting at board meetings;  expanding  the role of board committees  that are
independent  of executive  directors;  disclosing  the amount  and rationale  of managerial
compensation;  and opposing  anti-takeover  defenses  that are designed  to protect incumbent
managers  at the expense  of shareholders.
Of these measures,  the use of cumulative  voting  for board elections  seems  to be the most
powerful  tool for allowing  institutional  shareholders  to elect  directors  that are truly  independent
of corporate  managers  and play  an active  part in protecting  the interests  of shareholders.  Of major
importance  is also the increasing  use of board committees  consisting  of nonexecutive  directors  to:
select and appoint  chief  executive  officers  (to avert the perpetuation  of the business  policies  of
incumbent  management);  vet managerial  compensation  (to prevent  excessive  packages  that are
unrelated  to performance);  approve  major expansion  plans  (to check managerial  tendencies  for
empire-building);  and evaluate  and respond  to friendly  and hostile  bids  (to ensure  that
shareholders  receive  maximum  value  from takeovers).
It is, however,  too early to assess  the long-term  effectiveness  of recent initiatives.
Nonexecutive  directors  and collective  bodies  may  over time be captured  by corporate
management.  Institutional  investors  are not interested  in second-guessing  management  and they
may  well have  a preference  for liquidity  rather  than control.  But their involvement  in corporate
governance  may  facilitate  the forced  replacement  of underperforming  managers.  Over  the past
decade  or so, several  large US corporations,  including  American  Express,  General  Motors, and
IBM, replaced  their management  in response  to pressure  from large  institutional  shareholders
(Monks  and Minow  1995).
Financial Regulation
The development  of securities  markets  and  the growth of institutional  investors  require
robust  and effective  regulation.  Most developing  countries  lack a robust  regulatory  framework,
15although copying laws and rules prevailing in more advanced countries is not a major exercise.
The real challenge is the shortage of experienced supervisors and the absence of a strong tradition
favoring compliance with the rules and discouraging regulatory forbearance.
The complex issues encountered in designing an effective regulatory framework are not
addressed in this paper. However, three important points may be made. First, the gradual increase
in the assets of institutional investors allows time for intensive training of regulators and for
developing a more sophisticated regulatory regime as the needs of institutional investors and
securities markets evolve and become more complex. Since its pension reform of 1981, Chile has
strengthened considerably the regulation and supervision of both financial institutions and markets
and other reforming countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe have engaged in long-term
programs of upgrading their regulatory systems. Second, given the absence of long traditions in
institutional investing, developing countries may well start by adopting a strict regulatory
framework and then proceed to relax it as the supply of financial instruments evolves and the case
for adopting the more flexible  "prudent person" rule becomes more credible (Vittas 1998). Third,
involving foreign institutions in the operation of institutional investors lowers the importance of
strict regulations and effective supervision since large foreign institutions have both the resources
and the expertise to operate prudently and effectively. And large foreign institutions also have
their reputation at stake.
One regulatory policy that has caused considerable controversy is the imposition of
investment limits on the portfolios of institutional investors in newly reforming developing
countries and especially the prohibition or very low limits applied on holdings of overseas assets.
In the long run, all types of financial institutions should be encouraged to hold diversified
portfolios, which for institutional investors, especially pension funds and insurance companies,
should include equities and overseas assets. In the short run, imposing some investment limits may
be advisable given the small volume of accumulated resources and the need to develop asset
management expertise, although the latter constraint may be overcome by encouraging use of
internationally diversified local or foreign mutual funds. Any investment limits are unlikely to be
binding given the strong "home bias" of institutional investors (Brennan and Cao 1997). In the
long run, regulatory policy should move toward adoption of the "prudent person" rule with an
16implicit or explicit requirement for adequate portfolio diversification and an emphasis on the
fiduciary duty of asset managers to serve the interests of investors.
One final point before concluding this paper concerns the role of asset managers of
institutional funds that are part of large financial conglomerates. If asset managers belong to the
same group as large commercial banks (as is often the case in both developed and developing
countries), why would they act as a countervailing force to their affiliated companies? There is
clearly the possibility that group policies may steer asset managers away from undermining the
competitive position of commercial  banks. However, experience has shown that asset managers
promote the development of new products and practices that weaken the relative role of
traditional banks. This may be attributed to different objectives and constraints facing asset
managers, especially the fiduciary duty imposed on them, or to differences in the relative
importance of asset managers and banks in particular financial groups, or to the existence of some
independent asset managers. But it may also be explained by the complementary nature of bank
and nonbank types of financial services, which would imply that both banks and asset managers
(as well as other parts of financial  groups) benefit from the development of new products and
services. However, given the recency of these developments and the continuing trend toward
consolidation and conglomeration, the long-term impact of institutional investors on the behavior
and performance of financial groups is an open question.
Concluding Remarks
This paper argues that the promotion of private pension funds and insurance companies
should be pursued for their own sake and their potential economic, fiscal and financial  benefits
and should not be dependent on the prior development of securities markets. The situation of
mutual funds is different since mutual funds are unlikely to thrive unless the markets for the
instruments in which they specialize are themselves well developed.
The limited supply of suitable financial instruments should not be a major obstacle for the
creation of pension funds and insurance companies. These institutions will accumulate their long-
term financial resources on a gradual but steady basis, providing ample time to reforming
govemments to develop their securities markets. A far more important factor than the state of
development of securities markets would normally be the existence of strong political
17commitment  to a holistic  reform  program  that would  need to cover not only pension  and
insurance  reform  but also broader macroeconomic,  fiscal,  banking  and capital  market reforms.
Given  this commitment,  institutional  investors  can provide  a strong stimulus  to the
development  of securities  markets.  They can act as a countervailing  force  to the dominant
position  of commercial  banks,  stimulate  financial  innovation,  modernize  capital  markets,  enhance
transparency  and information  disclosure,  and strengthen  corporate  governance.
The second half  of this paper examines  the impact  of institutional  investors  on the US
securities  markets,  noting  the advent  of competitive  bidding  for corporate securities,  the
development  of mortgage  securitization  and derivative  products,  the introduction  of indexed
funds,  the modernization  of trading  and related  facilities,  and the use of collective  bodies  and
specialized  monitors  for strengthening  corporate  governance.  Some  developments  in the United
Kingdom  as well  as Chile  and Argentina  are also noted.
But the paper also emphasizes  that it takes  time for institutional  investors  to reach the
critical  level that would  allow  them to play  a catalytic  role in capital  market  development.  Several
of the practices  now  found in developing  countries  also characterized  the US market in the 1940s
and 1950s  when institutional  investors  were about to come of age. Nevertheless,  some  of the
beneficial  effects  of institutional  investors  are taking  place  faster in developing  countries  because
of the experience  gained  in advanced  countries  and because  of the transfer  of financial  expertise
that electronic  technology  and globalization  make  possible  in modern  times.
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